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Barber 1 
The following is the second chapter of my honors thesis, “Jefferson’s ‘Marble 
Mausoleum’: Incongruence in the Historical Memory of Thomas Jefferson, 1936-1945.” The 
first chapter covers the Thomas Jefferson Memorial Commission’s formation and situates the 
commission’s memory of Jefferson into the political and economic landscape of the time. The 
third chapter explores the incorporation of Jefferson as an “abolitionist” into the memorial and 
determines how memory of early American slavery influenced the memorialization of Jefferson. 
It also focuses on African American perceptions of the memorial. 
 
The “Cherry Tree Rebellion”: Jefferson’s Controversial Addition to the Washington Memorial 
Landscape, 1936 - 1939 
 
Introduction: The “Cherry Tree Rebellion” 
 
“Cherry trees caused more excitement today than they have since, it was said, young 
George Washington whacked one down,” reported ​The​ ​Daily Boston Globe​ on November 19, 
1938.  The newspaper recounted the “Cherry Tree Rebellion,” a term coined by Washington, 1
D.C. newspapers to describe the 150 women who chained themselves to Japanese cherry trees 
around the Tidal Basin.  These women intended to prevent the trees from being removed for the 2
construction of the Thomas Jefferson Memorial. One of the cherry tree rebels angrily told a 
reporter from ​The​ ​Chicago Daily Tribune​, “this is the worst desecration of the Capital since the 
British burned the White House.”  The women made headlines around the country.​ ​“Washington 3
Women Fight to Save Cherry Trees” was the front page story of the November 19, 1938 
Hartford Courant. ​The article explained that the women were ​“grabbing shovels from astonished 
workmen” and “started refilling the holes left gaping by the uprooted flora.”  Later in the day, as 4
1 “Women Defend Cherry Trees,” ​Daily Boston Globe ​(Boston, MA), November 19, 1938, 1. 
2 The phrase “Cherry Tree Rebellion was used in ​The​ ​New York Times​, “Roosevelt Curbs Tree 'Rebellion',” ​New 
York Times ​(New York, NY), Nov 19, 1938, 19.​; the women at the rebellion were described in the ​Chicago Daily 
Tribune, ​ “Women Vanquish Police in Battle of Cherry Trees,” ​Chicago Daily Tribune ​(Chicago, IL), November 19, 
1938, 2.  
3 “Women Vanquish Police in Battle of Cherry Trees,” ​Chicago Daily Tribune ​(Chicago, IL), November 19, 1938, 
2.  
4 “Washington Women Fight to Save Cherry Trees,” ​The Hartford Courant ​(Hartford, CT), November 19, 1938, 1. 
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The​ ​New York Times ​reported, “rain brought an armistice.”  ​The “Cherry Tree Rebellion” was 5
the culmination of a long controversy over the site and design selection of the Jefferson 
Memorial, which President Franklin D. Roosevelt deemed “the worst case of flim-flamming” 
that Washington D.C. had faced in a long time.  How did this “flim-flamming” catch the 6
attention of the president, the Washington public, and newspapers around the nation? 
Years of negative press coverage regarding the Jefferson Memorial preceded the Cherry 
Tree Rebellion, which indicated a rift between the Washington public and the Thomas Jefferson 
Memorial Commission (TJMC) over the proposed site and design. The fluctuating historical 
memory of Thomas Jefferson and changing perceptions of how the government should use 
public land lead to disagreement over the memorial plans. The controversy revealed incongruent 
interpretations of Jefferson’s legacy: the TJMC viewed Jefferson as a symbol of Americanness 
and founder of the democratic party, but the Washington public remembered him as an 
unpretentious advocate for the people. The tension over the design for the memorial revealed 
contention over the meaning of Jefferson. The TJMC insisted upon a classical, non-utilitarian 
memorial similar to the Lincoln Memorial.  Washingtonians largely disagreed.  7
Washington-based papers, including ​The​ ​Washington Post,​ published articles and 
editorials that expressed not only the qualms the press had with the memorial site and design, but 
5 “Cherry-Tree Truce is Forced by Rain,” ​The New York Times ​(New York, NY), November 20, 1938, 3.  
6 Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines flim-flam as “deceptive nonsense.” See, ​The Merriam-Webster.com 
Dictionary​, s.v. “flimflam (​n.​),” accessed November 25, 2019, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/flimflam​. Franklin Roosevelt used the phrase at a press conference. 
See,​ Five Hundred and First Press Conference, November 18, 1938, ​The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, ​Franklin D. Roosevelt and Samuel I. Rosenman, (New York: Random House, 1938-1949), 7, 605. 
7 I use the phrases “utilitarian” and “non-utilitarian” throughout this chapter because they were consistently used by 
both Washingtonians and the TJMC in congressional hearings and newspaper articles. I am not referencing 
architectural “Utilitarianism” that was popularized in the twentieth century, but rather the usefulness and practicality 
of a structure. I specify a “utilitarian” memorial as one with a function other than as a space of memory, such as an 
auditorium or stadium. 
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also the concerns of some members of the Washington public. The Washingtonians who had the 
loudest opinions about the memorial were middle-to-upper class whites, including the 150 
women who participated in the Cherry Tree Rebellion. The women were members of 
Washington women’s clubs, which women used in the mid-nineteenth century as a forum for 
women to discuss and advocate for their political views.  The Cherry Tree Rebels felt entitled to 8
protest the construction of the memorial because they viewed themselves as part of the culture of 
the capital. The women felt they were protecting the interests of the Washington people. 
These Washingtonians’ protests were not taken seriously by the president or the TJMC 
because of the Roosevelt administration's hostile relationship with the Washington press, who 
voiced the concerns of the people.  The recent big-government changes of the New Deal had 9
attracted negative press coverage and editors of ​The New York Times​ and ​The​ ​Washington Post 
did not have amicable relationships with President Roosevelt. Reporters often disapproved of 
Roosevelt, a face of the TJMC, due to his dismissive demeanor at press conferences. 
Washingtonians’ concerns warranted serious consideration by the TJMC and Roosevelt because 
they consistently and forcefully expressed their disquietude through several outlets. 
Washingtonians were present at congressional hearings, wrote to members of the TJMC, and 
protested at the site of the Jefferson Memorial, but the TJMC persisted with their plan for a 
classical, non-utilitarian memorial at the Tidal Basin site. The president and the TJMC blamed 
the push back against the plans for the Jefferson Memorial on the press coverage it received and 
did not give the people’s protests, including the Cherry Tree Rebellion, merit. 
8 Joyce Appleby, Eileen Chang, and Neva Goodwin, ​The Encyclopedia of Women in American History ​(2002), 
“Women’s Club Movement.” (Armonk, NY: Routledge), 455. 
9 Because the Washington Press consistently voiced the concerns the Washington public had with the memorial site 
and design, I will use “Washingtonians” to refer to the like-minded elements of the press and vocal citizens. 
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Most of the Washington public’s resistance to the memorial plans related to their distaste 
for the classical design and ideas of how public land should be used. To them, it was important to 
have a useful building and to preserve the beauty of West Potomac Park, which surrounded the 
Tidal Basin. The cherry trees at West Potomac Park were essential to Washington’s economy 
because they brought considerable income to the city through tourism and many Washingtonians 
feared a change would result in income loss. Washingtonians did not see a purpose in building 
another classical memorial in the Capital because the Lincoln and Washington memorials 
already dominated the landscape of the mall. In addition, memorialization trends were not in 
favor of the Jefferson Memorial. Architectural historian Kirk Savage explained in ​Monument 
Wars ​that the “hero monument” had lost popularity and “victim monuments” like the Lincoln 
Memorial and the 1931 World War I monument were created.  The World War I monument 10
included a bandstand, making it a “living memorial,” or a utilitarian one.  Living memorials 11
were favored over statue monuments after the First World War.  The Washington public largely 12
turned to the press to voice their concerns with the plans for the memorial site and design. 
The TJMC felt an urgency to silence the press because they associated the creation of a 
non-utilitarian, classical memorial (comparable to George Washington’s and Abraham 
Lincoln’s) with the validation of the Democratic party. The Democrats viewed the Jefferson 
Memorial as their imprint on the Washington memorial landscape, as the Lincoln Memorial was 
for the Republicans.  Roosevelt and the New Deal Democrats used Jefferson as a face of their 13
10 Kirk Savage, ​Monument Wars ​(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009), 244.  
11 Savage, ​Monument Wars​, 241.  
12 Savage, ​Monument Wars​, 241.  
13 Kirk Savage articulated this argument, writing that “Franklin Roosevelt and the Democrats saw it as a way to put 
their imprint on the Capital’s monumental core, which, until then, had been dominated by Republican plans and 
Republican heroes.” See, Savage, ​Monument Wars, ​244. 
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party, and often asserted that their policies were “Jeffersonian” because of their progressiveness 
and flexible interpretation of the Constitution.  Because of their party’s reverence for Jefferson, 14
they saw their administration as the only one capable of memorializing him.  The Commission’s 15
conception of Jefferson as akin to Washington and Lincoln was inflexible because of the political 
importance New Deal Democrats placed on Jefferson. In contrast, the Washington public had a 
dynamic conception of Jefferson that changed as portions of the plan for the memorial were 
released. They interpreted Jefferson as a figure to defend their positions on the memorial and 
invoked him differently throughout the memorial’s creation. Themes of Jefferson as simple and 
forward-looking rang through their changing interpretations of the figure. 
The TJMC’s conception of Jefferson as an “apostle of freedom” that needed a classical, 
non-utilitarian memorial at the Tidal Basin did not resonate with Washingtonians because his 
position in American memory was in a state of change.  Scholars including Merrill Peterson, 16
Francis Cogliano, and Andrew Burstein have considered the status of Jefferson’s reputation in 
the mid twentieth-century. Peterson, who wrote the primary work on Jefferson’s legacy, asserted 
that during this time Jefferson’s reputation was essentially a blank slate. As the United States 
underwent the Great Depression and the New Deal reforms, Americans were forced to reassess 
what “Jeffersonian” meant. Burstein noted in ​Democracy’s Muse ​(2015) that throughout 
14 Merrill D. Peterson, ​The Jefferson Image in the American Mind ​(Charlottesville, VA: Thomas Jefferson Memorial 
Foundation: University Press of Virginia, 1998), 355-359.  
15At his 501st press conference, Roosevelt asserted that the Democratic administration’s revival in 1933 was the 
reason why the TJMC was established in 1936,  Five Hundred and First Press Conference, November 18, 1938, ​The 
Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt​, 7, 605; The chairman of the Memorial Commission, New 
York Senator (and Democrat) John J. Boylan, blamed his failure in his first attempt to pass a resolution to 
memorialize Jefferson on the Republican Administration, stating “our good friends the Republicans were in power, 
and they did not pay any attention,” U.S. Congress, House,​ Site for the Thomas Jefferson Memorial​, April 23rd, 
1937​,​ 75th Cong., 1st sess., 1937, H. J. Res. 337, serial 180738, 57. 
16 Roosevelt called Jefferson an “apostle of freedom” at the dedication for the memorial. See, Address at Dedication 
of the Thomas Jefferson Memorial, April 13, 1943, ​The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin​, 12, 162.  
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“Jefferson’s twentieth-century makeover,” it was the “Democrats who ‘owned him.’”  New 17
Deal Democrats replaced Thomas Jefferson’s association with defined political principles such 
as states rights, free trade, and “least government.”  Jefferson became a symbol of progressive 18
thought, democracy, and freedom, rather than a political ideology. The New Deal Democrats 
emphasized Jefferson’s idea that “the earth belongs to the living” and presented him as a figure 
that would support the changes they made to the American government.  This did not fully 19
resonate with the people of Washington. As the United States faced major changes, Jefferson’s 
reputation did as well. Therefore, interpretation of Jefferson and how he would be memorialized 
was susceptible to controversy. 
The moment of the Jefferson Memorial’s creation is unique because it provided an 
opportunity for members of the Washington public to discuss their perception of Jefferson in 
public forums. Historians of Jefferson’s legacy have analyzed the creation of the Jefferson 
Memorial as a reflection of the revival of Jefferson’s reputation, but have not acknowledged the 
significance of the resistance the TJMC faced. Historians are often critical of newspapers as a 
reflection of public opinion because of the many bias-holding individuals involved in writing and 
publishing them, but the newspaper articles and editorials about the Jefferson Memorial 
controversy are legitimate reflections of prominent Washingtonians’ interpretations of Jefferson. 
Their ideas were consistent and re-asserted at congressional hearings, protests, and through 
letters to congressmen. Washington newspapers best capture the controversy surrounding the 
memorial because they were seen by Washingtonians as the primary outlet to express their 
qualms with the memorial. The editorial boards were often populated with Washingtonians who 
17 Andrew Burstein, ​Democracy’s Muse ​(Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2015), 7.  
18 Peterson, ​The Jefferson Image in the American Mind​, 358-359.  
19 ​Ibid.​, 356.  
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pursued a similar agenda regarding the memorial. Interpreting the newspaper sources as a 
legitimate reflection of how Jefferson was remembered by Washingtonians gives historians the 
chance to understand how people without government or scholarly roles understood an 
influential, yet controversial early American.  
Jefferson’s reputation frequently undergoes changes. Understanding the points of change 
can remove the layers of historical memory that Jefferson hides under. In the mid-twentieth 
century, memory of Jefferson moved away from focus on his political ideas and towards a more 
abstract association with American morals. This shift impacts Americans and historians today, as 
they grapple with the paradox of Jefferson: a symbol of freedom, but also a slaveholder. The 
Jefferson Memorial does not reflect Jefferson as a man or leader. It represents the specific image 
of Jefferson that was in the minds of members of the TJMC.  It does not reveal Americans’ or 
Washingtonians’ perception of Jefferson. Instead, it reflects a sense of urgency that the members 
of the TJMC held - that Jefferson needed to be vaunted in memory alongside Presidents Lincoln 
and Washington. 
“The Worst Case of Flim-Flamming”: The TJMC and the Press 
The tension between the TJMC and Washington newspapers reached its height when 
Roosevelt called the press coverage of the Thomas Jefferson Memorial “a complete deception of 
the public” at a press conference on November 18th, 1938.  That same week, a member of the 20
Memorial Commission wrote to an editor of ​The​ ​Washington Post​, requesting that he cease 
publishing such negative coverage on the memorial.  Washington newspapers continued to 21
20 Five Hundred and First Press Conference, November 18, 1938, ​The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt​, 7, 605.  
21 Jefferson Randolph Kean to Felix Morely, (Letter, Washington, D.C., November 30, 1938), University of Virginia 
Small Special Collections Library, Correspondence and Records Regarding the Thomas Jefferson Memorial in 
Washington, 1917-1943, box 1. 
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publish articles with headlines including “Memorial Flimflam,” “More Readers Protest: Stop 
This Vandalism” and “Women Vanquish Police in Battle of Cherry Trees.”  The tense 22
relationship between the Washington Press and the Roosevelt Administration created an 
environment that led the TJMC to blame the memorial controversy on the press rather than take 
the public’s concerns seriously. Shifting this blame allowed the TJMC to maintain its conception 
of Jefferson as a Democratic hero despite its incongruence with the public’s indistinct idea of 
him. 
The​ ​Washington Post​ was the loudest voice against the memorial. Eugene Meyer, the 
owner of the paper and a Republican financier disapproved of “unlimited and careless spending 
of public funds” and the ​Post​ often took stances against the New Deal government.  Felix 23
Morely, the editor of the editorial page, published letters that highlighted the position of ​The 
Washington Post​’s readership against the site and design of the memorial. Washingtonians 
frequently wrote to the editors of the ​Post ​because they recognized saw the paper​ ​as the primary 
outlet to express their thoughts on the memorial. The TJMC and President recognized the paper 
as a threat to their memorial plans and saw them as influential over their Washington readership.  
The Roosevelt Administration’s tense relationship with Washington news outlets 
extended to the Washington bureau of ​The​ ​New York Times, ​who often published news about the 
Jefferson Memorial​. ​Both Washington reporters and President Roosevelt recognized the ​Times ​as 
an essential Washington paper.  In 1936, sociologist Leo Rosten polled 127 Washington 24
22 Jack Stearns Gray "More Readers Protest: ‘Stop this Vandalism’," ​The Washington Post​, Nov 18, 1938, 1; Fred 
Huddleston, "The Memorial and the Cherry Trees," ​The Washington Post​, Nov 19, 1938, 8; ​“Women Vanquish 
Police in Battle of Cherry Trees,” ​Chicago Daily Tribune ​(Chicago, IL), November 19, 1938, 2. 
23 Chalmers Roberts, ​The Washington Post: The First 100 Years​ (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977), 
205. 
24 Donald Ritchie, ​Reporting From Washington: The History of the Washington Press Corps​ (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 7.  
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correspondents, asking them to list “the three newspapers which give the most fair and reliable 
news.”  He also asked them to note which ones were “the least fair and reliable.”  In Rosten’s 25 26
study, ​The​ ​New York Times​ was listed first most often for “most fair and reliable” and not on the 
list of “least fair and reliable.” Even with that “unbiased” reputation, they had a complicated 
relationship with the Roosevelt administration. The Washington bureau of the ​Times​ was run by 
Arthur Krock, who was considered “THE Washington Correspondent” by other reporters.  27
Krock suggested that the Roosevelt Administration had “more ruthlessness, intelligence and 
subtlety in trying to suppress legitimate unfavorable comments than any other I have known.”  28
Krock’s importance in the network of the Washington press meant that his ideas about Roosevelt 
influenced other reporters. 
Roosevelt’s habit to suppress “unfavorable comments” was especially evident during his 
press conferences. In Rosten’s study, he explained that Roosevelt had an amicable relationship 
with the Washington press correspondents until around 1935, when the correspondents began to 
feel irritated with Roosevelt’s “calculated” presence at press conferences.  He wrote that 29
“newspapermen began to feel that the exercise of presidential wit to evade a question was less of 
a novelty than an irritant.”  The tension between the Roosevelt Administration and Washington 30
Press that culminated in the Cherry Tree Rebellion built for years before 1938. Blaming the press 
for the memorial controversy allowed President Roosevelt and the TJMC to be unreceptive to the 
25 Leo C. Rosten, ​The Washington Correspondents ​(New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1937), 194.  
26 Rosten, ​The Washington Correspondents​, 194.  
27 Ritchie, ​Reporting From Washington: The History of the Washington Press Corps​, 13.  
28 Rosten, ​The Washington Correspondents​, 57.  
29 ​Ibid.​, 53-57.  
30 ​Ibid.​, 57. 
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needs of Washingtonians and let their vaunted conception of Jefferson persist through the 
creation of the memorial. 
Roosevelt’s 501st press conference on November 18th, 1938, provides a glimpse into 
how the TJMC and president approached the press. It was the first time Roosevelt was asked 
about the “Cherry Tree Rebellion” and he called it “one of the most interesting cases of a 
flim-flam game being started by the owner of a paper.”  Roosevelt did not address any problems 31
the public had with the memorial other than the destruction of the cherry trees and he blamed the 
public’s uproar regarding the trees on the coverage from Washington news sources. At the end of 
the conference, a reporter interjected, “of course this is serious to some of us newspaper men. 
Women are going down there to chain themselves to these trees.”  Roosevelt interrupted him 32
with, “we will move the tree and the lady and the chains, and transplant them to some other 
place,” to which the conference responded with laughter.  Roosevelt did not take the reporter 33
seriously, exemplifying Arthur Krock’s suspicion that Roosevelt worked to silence the press’ 
dissent regarding his decisions. 
At the same press conference, Roosevelt said, “I don’t suppose there is anybody in the 
world who loves trees quite as much as I do.”  He went on to attempt to satisfy the press by 34
telling them that the 88 cherry trees removed would be replaced with 1,000 more surrounding the 
Tidal Basin.  John J. Boylan, the chairman of the TJMC, used this same method to appease the 35
public more than a year earlier, at the hearings for the site of the memorial on April 23rd, 1937. 
31 Five Hundred and First Press Conference, November 18, 1938, ​The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, ​7, 605. 
32 ​Ibid​., 607.  
33 ​Ibid​. 
34 ​Ibid​., 606. 
35 ​Ibid​. 
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Boylan expressed, “no one has a greater love for trees and flowers and shrubs than I have.”  36
Boylan may have claimed that he was the greatest tree-admirer, but President Roosevelt 
apparently felt otherwise. How did the controversy surrounding the Jefferson Memorial become 
a forum to brag about loving cherry trees more than most? Boylan and Roosevelt’s statements 
were their way to dismiss the public’s concern over the memorial as only related to the trees. 
Calling themselves tree-lovers was a snide way for them to put off the real issues people had 
with the memorial, which were related to Jefferson’s legacy. The press, especially ​The 
Washington Post​, poked fun at their assumptions. One editorial asked, “If ‘Franklin D.’ does cut 
down the cherry trees with his little hatchet, will he deny doing it, or will he tell his mother the 
truth?”  37
The hostile relationship between the TJMC and the press was exacerbated when the 
TJMC made efforts to stop the press’ articles about the destruction of the cherry trees by 
contacting Felix Morely, an editor of ​The​ ​Washington Post​. Both Boylan and Roosevelt 
considered ​The​ ​Washington Post​ to be one of the most influential sources on the public’s 
position regarding the memorial.  Jefferson Randolph Kean, a presidential appointee to the 38
TJMC and descendant of Jefferson, wrote to Morely on behalf of the TJMC on November 18th, 
1938. Kean requested that the ​Post​ cease publishing negative articles about the memorial site 
36 U.S. Congress, House,​ Site for the Thomas Jefferson Memorial​, April 23rd, 1937, 58.   
37 Zack Spratt, letter to the editor, ​The Washington Post ​(Washington, D.C.), April 17, 1937. 
38 At Roosevelt’s 501st press conference, he stated “I don’t know whether I should be polite as to what was done by 
Washington newspapers or not, especially two newspapers in Washington,” see Five Hundred and First Press 
Conference, November 18, 1938, ​The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, ​7, 605; At the 
congressional hearings for the memorial, New York Senator John J. Boylan blamed newspapers for the controversy 
when he said, “suddenly there was a great outcry in some of the papers that we were going to destroy the cherry 
blossoms,” U.S. Congress, House,​ Site for the Thomas Jefferson Memorial​, April 23rd, 1937​,​ 59; cross referencing 
these two statements with TJMC member Jefferson Randolph Kean’s letter addressing the ​Post’s ​coverage on the 
memorial reveals that the commission thought of​ The Washington Post​ to be an extremely influential source over the 
Washington public’s opinion regarding the memorial. See Jefferson Randolph Kean to Felix Morely, (Letter, 
Washington, D.C., November 30, 1938), 2. 
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choice, especially regarding the cherry trees.  Felix Morely responded a few days later, “it is not 39
a matter of the uprooting of a few dozen cherry trees, which we have certainly never stressed as 
vital in our editorials.”  In his letter, Morely explicitly explained his stance on the design of the 40
memorial. Morely wrote his “humble opinion” that the proposed memorial would be “less rather 
than more appropriate with the passage of time” because of the classical design.  Classical 41
architecture was associated with Jefferson’s era of American history, not the mid-twentieth 
century. Kean responded curtly, writing, “your objection to the site selected is that you do not 
like classic monuments in parks - this is a question of taste and there is a [sic] old classic saying 
that matters of taste are not subjects for dispute.” Kean continued, “so in a matter like this in 
which every one has an interest and each also a right to his own opinion, you will, I am sure, 
agree with me that there is no occasion for passion or for the ascription of unworthy motives.”  42
The correspondence between Morely and Kean not only reveals the tension between the ​Post ​and 
the TJMC, but also indicates what was at stake for each side of the controversy.  
The “Subjects for Dispute”: A Classical Jefferson Memorial 
The hostility between the Washingtonians and the TJMC was driven by different ideas of 
how Jefferson should be memorialized. The classical, non-utilitarian design held political 
significance to the TJMC. The Washingtonians considered the memorial in the context of the 
city, and felt the design was not fitting to the landscape. Both sides invoked Jefferson’s legacy 
39 Felix Morely to Jefferson Randolph Kean, (Letter, Washington, D.C., November 26, 1938), University of Virginia 
Small Special Collections Library, Correspondence and Records Regarding the Thomas Jefferson Memorial in 
Washington, 1917-1943, box 1, 1.  
40 Felix Morely to Jefferson Randolph Kean, (Letter, Washington, D.C., November 26, 1938), 1.  
41 Felix Morely to Jefferson Randolph Kean, (Letter, Washington, D.C., November 26, 1938), 2.  
42 Jefferson Randolph Kean to Felix Morely, (Letter, Washington, D.C., November 30, 1938), 2.  
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when defending their position on the memorial. These discussions of Jefferson reveal his 
complicated position in American memory at the time. 
Jefferson Randolph Kean’s desire to preserve the TJMC’s plan and quiet the ​Post 
stemmed from the political importance the commission rested on the memorial. It was to be a 
Democratic memorial that placed Jefferson on the same pedestal as Republican presidents 
memorialized in the capital city. A ​New York Times​ article from April 16th, 1938, reported “the 
capital is divided today in a debate over the relative virtues of elegance of the Pantheon and 
simplicity of the White House. The center of the controversy is the Thomas Jefferson Memorial.”
 The article was sure to indicate “the president likes the pantheon. So do Representative John 43
Boylan of New York, who is chairman of the Thomas Jefferson Memorial Commission, and Dr. 
Fiske Kimball of Philadelphia, a member of the commission, who helped in the restoration of 
Monticello.”  TJMC presented a unified front against Washingtonians’ suggestions for the 44
memorial. The conflict over the classical, non-utilitarian design of the memorial was central to 
the controversy.  
The TJMC was hesitant to change their position on the design for the Jefferson Memorial 
because they wanted it to be viewed similarly to the Lincoln Memorial, which was dedicated to 
the “Republican hero” in May of 1922.  The idea that few presidents were worthy of a classical, 45
non-utilitarian memorial in Washington was articulated at the hearings for the memorial: “there 
are three men who are in a class by themselves - Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln. 
Washington was the father of our country, Lincoln saved it, and Jefferson made it a democracy, 
43 Blair Bolles, “Jefferson Memorial a Storm Center,” ​New York Times,​ Apr 17, 1938. 
44 Blair Bolles, “Jefferson Memorial a Storm Center,” ​New York Times,​ Apr 17, 1938. 
45 Savage, ​Monument Wars​, 244. 
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which it was not before.”  Creating a classical, non-utilitarian memorial for Jefferson would 46
assert his position as one of the greatest American presidents. The TJMC knew the Jefferson 
memorial would be compared to the Lincoln and Washington memorials. In a review of a Fine 
Arts Commission report on the design for the memorial, one design was regarded as “inadequate 
in comparison with the importance of the ponderous mass of the Lincoln memorial.”  The 47
review stated that “even though these two memorials are considerable apart as to location, a 
comparison would be inevitable.”  At the hearings, there was extensive discussion about how 48
the Jefferson and Lincoln Memorial would compare in terms of placement and design. For 
instance, John J. Boylan, the TJMC’s chairman, mentioned criticism that the Jefferson Memorial 
would “​dwarf the Lincoln Memorial.”  Royal H. Carlock, a Washingtonian artist, suggested a 49
change to the site at the hearing. He asked “Why should we steal the beauty and grandeur that 
belong to Washington? Why should we destroy the beauty and grandeur that enshroud Lincoln?”
 The three memorials were bound to be compared. The TJMC felt the memorials should be 50
equal in stature because of their association between the American figures and their political 
parties. Lincoln’s memorial represented success of the Republican party and the TJMC wanted 
the Jefferson memorial to assert the Democrats’ similar historical prominence.  
The Washington public saw a classic, non-utilitarian memorial as inappropriate to 
Jefferson’s legacy and were concerned about the design’s fit in the Washington landscape. Felix 
Morely ignored Kean’s requests to stop negative coverage on the memorial and asserted in the 
46 U.S. Congress, House,​ Site for the Thomas Jefferson Memorial​, April 23rd, 1937, 124. 
47 Otto Eggers to Stuart Gibboney, (Letter, New York, N.Y., March 11, 1939), University of Virginia Small Special 
Collections Library, Correspondence and Records Regarding the Thomas Jefferson Memorial in Washington, 
1917-1943, box 1, 1.  
48 Otto Eggers to Stuart Gibboney, (Letter, New York, N.Y., March 11, 1939), 1.  
49 U.S. Congress, House,​ Site for the Thomas Jefferson Memorial​, April 23rd, 1937, 60. 
50 U.S. Congress, House,​ Site for the Thomas Jefferson Memorial​, April 23rd, 1937​,​ 104. 
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Post’s​ editorial section that the design of the memorial was central to the public’s opposition.  51
The day after Morely received the letter from Kean, the ​Post ​published a letter to the editor from 
a Washingtonian named Gladys Atbee that was written on November 28th, 1938. Atbee asked, 
“Why should he have a tomb of classic inutility?”  Atbee’s position was one many other 52
Washingtonians held. It is significant that the Post published Atbee’s criticism of the memorial 
so shortly after the exchange between Felix Morely and Jefferson Randolph Kean because she 
explicitly disapproved of the non-utilitarian, classical design. Morely and the ​Post ​chose this 
piece because Atbee expressed that cared about the type of memorial that was to be created 
rather than the well-being of the cherry trees. The headline “More about the Jefferson Memorial” 
was bound to catch the eye of Kean. 
Many Washingtonians felt classical memorials were out of style and they argued that the 
design was not complementary to West Potomac park. This sentiment was asserted in ​The 
Washington Post​ editorials and reinforced at congressional hearings. Washingtonians explained 
how they remembered Jefferson while defending their position on the memorial. The writer of 
The​ ​Washington Post ​editorial “No Case for the Memorial,” called Jefferson an “apostle of 
simplicity,” and said Jefferson himself would oppose a classical memorial because of his 
“frugality and unpretentious Americanism.”  It continued, “Everything about the memorial 53
project runs counter to the spirit of the man who chose as his last resting place the simple hillside 
vault amid the woods of Monticello.”  Another Washingtonian expressed in a letter to the editor, 54
“I do not approve of memorials in marble! A cold awe-inspiring spectacle - not commensurate to 
51 Gladys Atbee, Letter to the editor, ​The Washington Post, ​Dec 01, 1938.   
52 Gladys Atbee, Letter to the editor, ​The Washington Post, ​Dec 01, 1938.  
53 "No Case for the Memorial," ​The Washington Post,​ Apr 23, 1937. 
54 "No Case for the Memorial." ​The Washington Post,​ Apr 23, 1937. 
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the humanity so typical of the living Jefferson!”  The Washingtonians had broader support from 55
papers other than ​The​ ​Washington Post​, including the ​St. Louis Dispatch, Washington Evening 
Star, ​and​ New York Times-Herald​, which published that the design was “suitable to the 
Versailles of Louis XIV but totally alien to everything for which Jefferson stood.”  ​At the 56
congressional hearings for the memorial, members of the public expressed their distaste for the 
classical design. One woman urged the commission to consider the “memory of Jefferson” 
before they “permit the Jefferson Memorial Commission to destroy the life of a single cherry 
tree, to drain a drip of water from the Tidal Basin, to blast a single rock for this Pope-Ietinos 
design.”  A classical memorial to Jefferson did not resonate with the Washington public because 57
they viewed Jefferson as a representation of simplicity. Their thoughts about memorialization 
were shaped by their experience of the Great Depression and they viewed Jefferson as an 
advocate for the people. 
Classical monuments were also unappealing to experts in design, including many 
American architects. They were familiar with both Jefferson’s architectural work and 
contemporary architecture, so they felt strongly about the design for the memorial. Much like the 
55 Jack Stearns Gray, letter to the editor, ​The Washington Post,​ Nov 18, 1938, 1. 
56 An article published in the​ New York Herald-Tribune​ described the memorial design as “a pile of Roman 
architecture at variance with Jefferson’s simplicity and his contribution to developing a modern native architecture.” 
See ​“Art Battle on in Washington Over Memorial to Jefferson,” ​New York Herald-Tribune ​(New York, NY)​,​ April 
8, 1937. ​A piece published by the ​St. Louis Post-Dispatch ​remarked that people protesting the marble memorial 
“have pointed out that Jefferson was a free spirit, a hater of shams and pretenses and frauds, practicing his own life 
an almost Spartan simplicity and holding to the belief that the mark of high civilization was not its public 
monuments but the well being of its people.” See  ​Marquis W. Childs, “Proposed Jefferson Memorial in Washington 
Stirs Storm Equal to that Over Like St. Louis Project,” ​St. Louis Post-Dispatch ​(St. Louis MO)​,​ March 14, 1937. An 
article in the Washington Evening Star summed up the controversy surrounding the memorial and stated, “patriot’s 
fame grows while modern capital suffers from spirited controversy over form of his memorial and selection of site.” 
It asserted that the TJMC’s existence was in danger and that Washingtonians’ desired a memorial that would “take a 
mold more appropriate to the twentieth century.” See, William A. Millen, “Should Old Inspire New?,” ​Washington 
Evening Star ​(Washington, D.C.)​, ​May 08, 1938, C-5. 
57 ​U.S. Congress, House,​ Site for the Thomas Jefferson Memorial​, April 23rd, 1937​, 98. 
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TJMC and Washington public, architects manipulated memory of Jefferson to fit their ideas 
about the new structure in Washington. While the TJMC cast Jefferson as a classical architect 
and intended to memorialize him in the same style as Washington and Lincoln, architects 
focused on Jefferson’s forward-looking designs and considered him a progressive architect.  In 58
March of 1937, the Designers of Shelter in America indicated their stance on the memorial, “the 
proposed design has nothing whatsoever to do with the idealism of Thomas Jefferson, or with the 
idealism of America today. The proposed design is contrary to that very idea of a living 
American culture for which Jefferson fought during his entire life.”  In April 1937, Henry 59
Churchill, a prominent member of the American Institute of Architects, wrote, “Thomas 
Jefferson? Were the gentleman alive today he would be first to scorn the stupid erudition 
mistaken in his honor and, abreast of the advanced thought of today, as he was leader of the 
advanced thought of his own time, he would probably condemn both the folly and the waste.”  60
Architects generally wrote that the design for the memorial was outdated and did not reflect what 
58 The president of the League for Progress in Architecture, Henry Churchill, wrote a letter to ​The​ ​New York Times 
after they published an article about the design for the memorial. Churchill said, “The argument that Jefferson was a 
classicist does not hold water. Of course he was. It was the spirit of his time and culture. But what a classicist- how 
fresh his interpretation, how charming and alive.” See, U.S. Congress, House,​ Site for the Thomas Jefferson 
Memorial​, April 23rd, 1937​,​ 28.; One young architect wrote to President Roosevelt, “we find the design a 
perpetuation of that expensive frozen tastelessness that has long been characteristic of our public buildings.” See, 
Morris B Sanders to Franklin D. Roosevelt, (Letter, Washington, D.C., April 1st, 1937), Special Collections 
Research Center, The George Washington University, League for Progress in Architecture Records, box 1.; The 
Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians stated that the memorial was “impractical, 
estehtically [sic] weak, and contrary to the true Jeffersonian spirit.” See Rose Levine to Henry Churchill, (Letter, 
New York N.Y., March 25, 1937), Special Collections Research Center, The George Washington University, 
League for Progress in Architecture Records, box 1.; The American Federation of Arts wrote that they were 
“opposed to the erection of the proposed Jefferson Memorial” because “the approved design for the memorial does 
not express Jefferson’s ideals, philosophy, or manner of living.” See F.A. Whiting, American Federation of Arts 
(Washington, D.C., April 23, 1937), Special Collections Research Center, The George Washington University, 
League for Progress in Architecture Records, box 1. 
59 Walter Sanders, Public Affairs Committee, Designers of Shelter in America to TJMC, (Letter, New York, N.Y., 
March 24, 1937), Special Collections Research Center, The George Washington University, League for Progress in 
Architecture Records, box 1. 
60 Henry S. Churchill, (April, 1938) Special Collections Research Center, The George Washington University, 
League for Progress in Architecture Records, box 1. 
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Jefferson represented to them. They believed that the memorial should have been a progressive 
or modern design, as Jefferson was a forward-thinking leader and architect. 
Washingtonians, architects, and members of the TJMC based their arguments about the 
classical design for the memorial on different interpretations of Jefferson. While the TJMC 
defined Jefferson as a figure that surely needed a classical memorial, the public did not. While 
asserting their position against the classical design for the Jefferson Memorial, some people 
argued that Jefferson was a simple man (which is somewhat surprising considering the design of 
Monticello) and some that he valued progressive architecture above all else. These ideas stood 
out as common between Washingtonians, but they did not present a unified idea of what 
Jefferson meant to them or how he should be memorialized. They especially did not have the 
same conception of Jefferson that the TJMC did. While the public’s conceptions of Jefferson 
were not necessarily negative, they contrasted with the TJMC’s conceptions of him.  
The “Subjects for Dispute”: A Non-Utilitarian Jefferson Memorial 
The Washington public not only disapproved of the classical design, but also of the 
non-utilitarian nature of the Jefferson Memorial. The TJMC believed it was important for 
Jefferson to be memorialized in a non-utilitarian design because Washington and Lincoln had 
non-utilitarian memorials. The Washington public did not hold Jefferson to that standard and 
valued a utilitarian structure more than a shrine to the memory of Jefferson. Washington was 
recovering from a point of economic turmoil and many people did not see a use in constructing a 
memorial to Jefferson, especially in a spot that already brought the city money through tourism.  61
They felt that it would make more sense to create an auditorium, library, or other utilitarian 
61 U.S. Congress, House,​ Site for the Thomas Jefferson Memorial​, April 23rd, 1937, 99. 
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memorial. Washingtonians invoked their memory of Jefferson as an advocate for public interest 
while defending their stance on what fit into the landscape of Washington at the time. 
The​ ​Washington Post​’s editorial section included a vast number of criticisms of the 
non-utilitarian design choice as well as suggestions for utilitarian spaces. An article titled 
“Another Mausoleum,” published in ​The Washington Post​ on February 21st, 1937, (three days 
after the plans were released) reflected the position of the ​Post ​on the memorial. The article, 
which named no author, explained that “the memory of Jefferson is cherished today, not so much 
because he was a scholar, a president and author of the Declaration of Independence, but because 
he was a leader who trusted the common man.” It went on, “That is why many citizens hoped 
that the Jefferson Memorial Project would be combined with the movement to provide a useful 
auditorium in the capital city.”  On April 17th, 1937, Washingtonian C. L. Woosley wrote that 62
he disdained a memorial that shouted “look at me. I am the finest yet” and that it “hardly seems a 
fitting tribute to the great and democratic Jefferson.” He went on, “But a Jefferson Memorial 
Planetarium, erected elsewhere, could be made a marvel of beauty as well as a perpetual means 
of advancing knowledge.”  In a “Letter to the Editor,” a Mable Fern Faling of Washington 63
noted, “We all associate a library with the name of Jefferson.” Faling suggested that “various 
sections of Washington seem to be badly in need of libraries. Why should not a beautiful 
Jefferson library be built in some needed section. That would be another choice for a fitting 
memorial.”  Other individuals suggested the construction of a school, a scholarship for students 64
62 ​“Another Mausoleum,” ​The Washington Post ​(Washington, D.C.), February 21, 1937. 
63 C. L. Woolsey, letter to the editor, ​The Washington Post ​(Washington, D.C.), April 17, 1937. 
64 Mable Fern Faling, letter to the editor, ​The Washington Post ​(Washington, D.C.), April 13, 1937. 
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to attend the University of Virginia, or a patent museum.  The public expressed in ​The 65
Washington Post ​that they​ ​did not see a point in a non-utilitarian memorial. The construction of a 
new building through government funds allowed them to brainstorm public buildings they 
believed were needed in Washington. The ​Washington Evening-Star​ re-emphasized the ideas that 
were submitted to the ​Post, ​calling the design a “useless pile of marble.”  The Washingtonians 66
used Jefferson’s legacy to defend their choices, like in the case of the design of the memorial.  
Washingtonians asserted their stance on the non-utilitarian memorial at congressional 
hearings and reiterated their ideas that were published in ​The Washington Post.​ At the hearings, 
Washingtonians described their needs regarding public land, but the TJMC was not receptive. A 
woman representing a Washington citizen’s association passionately stated, “if you [Boylan] and 
the Congress should autocratically disregard the earnest entreaties of the thinking people of our 
country… Thomas Jefferson will look coldly down upon your futile efforts,” and presented the 
couplet: “Your temple by the Basin’s brim, A pile of stone will be to him.”  Instead of a pile of 67
stone, she suggested that the funds for the Jefferson Memorial be put towards an auditorium.  A 68
congressman from Nebraska followed her statements with a comment that, “this lady represents 
a local organization… perhaps she in some way reflects the ideas of people who are citizens of 
65 ​“Two Citizens Groups Oppose Shrine at Basin,” ​The Washington Post ​(Washington, D.C.), ​April 13, 1937; 
Mable Fern Faling, letter to the editor, ​The Washington Post ​(Washington, D.C.), April 13, 1937; Josephine C. 
McCormack, letter to the editor, ​The Washington Post ​(Washington, D.C.), April 17, 1937. 
66 An article wrapped up the proposals of Washingtonians regarding a utilitarian memorial and stated that 
Washingtonians wanted the TJMC to “give the public something that is sorely needed instead of erecting a useless 
pile of marble.” It went on, “some would like to see a great auditorium,” and “others would have the Thomas 
Jefferson Memorial take the form of scholarships to deserving young women and men in consideration of 
Jefferson’s own great love for learning and his keen interest in education,” and finally, “there are yet others who 
would like to see the Federal Government take over Monticello.” See ​William A. Millen, “Should Old Inspire 
New?,” ​Washington Evening Star ​(Washington, D.C.)​, ​May 08, 1938, C-5. 
67 U.S. Congress, House,​ Site for the Thomas Jefferson Memorial​, April 23rd, 1937​,​ 99​.   
68 ​Ibid​.  
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Washington.”  Her ideas were considered valid by other people present at the hearings, 69
including a representative of the Cleveland Museum of Art, who stated “I am absolutely opposed 
to spending millions of dollars on a great pile of masonry which can serve no useful end.”   70
Washington clubwomen, the same women who participated in the Cherry Tree Rebellion, 
presented their stance against the non-utilitarian memorial at the congressional hearings. Mrs. 
Ernest William Howard represented the District Federation of Women’s Clubs at the hearings for 
the memorial. She presented the stance of the 6,000 women that were members of Washington 
women’s clubs: “could Thomas Jefferson speak he would beg the Commission to construct a 
memorial which will prove of great use to the people of these United States, and not be a mere 
pile of brick, stone, and mortar.”  The clubwomen opposed a non-utilitarian memorial, and 71
suggested the construction of an auditorium, which would serve as a “lasting memorial to a great 
and wise leader who cared, above all things, for the welfare of all the people.”  Memory of 72
Jefferson as an advocate for the people was a consistent theme through Washingtonians’ defense 
of a utilitarian design. The women’s opposition to the memorial plans originated in their 
disapproval of the non-utilitarian memorial and culminated in the Cherry Tree Rebellion. Their 
distaste for the memorial was rooted in their ideas about the government’s use of public land and 
69 ​Ibid​. 
70 At the hearings for the site of the memorial, I.T. Frary of the Cleveland Museum of Art stated, “I am absolutely 
opposed to spending millions of dollars on a great pile of masonry which can serve no useful end.” A representative 
of a citizens association explained her stance that “there not enough palpable necessity for useful projects in our 
Capital that we must devote labor and taxes to a ‘mere memorial’ We need badly, among many other buildings, a 
comprehensive and efficient national employment bureau, a benign and scientific institute of human adjustment, 
Vocational schools, better hospitals, libraries, a national stadium, and especially a national auditorium.” Another 
representative of a Washington citizens association suggested “the acquisition of the property described above for 
the erection of a main public library building, or of a senior high school, or of a civic auditorium, or for some other 
useful project to honor the name of the man to whom this country owes so much.” See  U.S. Congress, House,​ Site 
for the Thomas Jefferson Memorial​, April 23rd, 1937, 57, 98, 99, 124.  
71 U.S. Congress, House,​ Site for the Thomas Jefferson Memorial​, April 23rd, 1937​,​ 101​.  
72 ​Ibid.  
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they invoked memory of Jefferson while defending their stance. The Cherry Tree Rebellion was 
not simply a case of “flim-flamming,” like President Roosevelt stated.  The Washington 73
clubwomen’s stance on the Jefferson Memorial was one that they maintained for more than a 
year before they tied themselves to cherry trees at the site of the construction for the memorial.  
Conclusion: Jefferson’s “Marble Mausoleum” 
The rift between the Washington public, press, and the TJMC that led to the Cherry Tree 
Rebellion stemmed from an incongruence in the interpretation of Jefferson, whose reputation 
was in a state of change. Until the mid-twentieth century, Jefferson was closely associated with 
his political ideology and was not an essentially American symbol, but the Great Depression and 
changes from the New Deal transformed American thought and Americans began to consider 
Jefferson differently. The mid-twentieth century shift in Jefferson’s legacy made his memory 
vulnerable to contrasting interpretations during the creation of the Jefferson memorial, such as 
those of the TJMC and Washington public. The TJMC closely associated Jefferson with the 
Democratic Party and remembered him as one of the greatest American presidents. They 
approved of the classical, non-utilitarian memorial design because they felt the Jefferson 
Memorial should compare to those for Presidents Washington and Lincoln. Washingtonians had 
a less defined memory of Jefferson. As they learned more about the memorial plans, their 
opinions regarding its site and design changed and they invoked Jefferson differently to support 
their positions. Jefferson represented progressive thinking, simplicity of design, the voice of the 
people, or all three at the same time. Rarely did the public’s conception of Jefferson align with 
the TJMC’s idea of Jefferson as an “apostle of freedom” to be memorialized with a “marble 
73 Five Hundred and First Press Conference, November 18, 1938, ​The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, ​7, 605. 
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mausoleum.”  The conflict over the memorial design was a result of the Washingtonians’ and 74
TJMC’s contested memories of Jefferson. The TJMC dismissed dissent regarding the memorial 
design because of the political significance they rested on the memorial. The unfriendly 
relationship between the Roosevelt Administration and the Washington press made the press an 
easy target for the TJMC to blame for the memorial controversy. The TJMC condensed the 
public’s uproar into distress over the destruction of the cherry trees around the Tidal Basin, even 
though many Washingtonians made it clear through news articles and speeches at congressional 
hearings that they were not as concerned with the cherry trees as they were with the classical, 
non-utilitarian design.  
The creation of the Jefferson Memorial is a valuable moment in historical memory of 
Thomas Jefferson because it gave individuals with diverse experiences the chance to directly 
state what Jefferson meant to them, or how he should be memorialized. The dispute over the 
memorial was passionate. The mid-twentieth century has been understood by historians of 
Jefferson’s reputation as a point where his legacy was restored, but the controversy over the 
memorial revealed that there was no unified understanding of Jefferson. Today, as Jefferson 
remains a controversial figure, it is important to acknowledge that there is not a precise or 
completely accurate interpretation of Jefferson. His legacy has been molded by historical 
memory to mean anything from division to democracy. 
74 At the dedication of the memorial, Roosevelt said in his speech, “We dedicate a shrine to freedom. To Thomas 
Jefferson, apostle of freedom, we are paying a debt long overdue.” See, Address at Dedication of the Thomas 
Jefferson Memorial, April 13, 1943, ​The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin, ​12, 162. Felix Morely dubbed 
the memorial a “marble mausoleum,” See Felix Morely to Jefferson Randolph Kean, (Letter, Washington, D.C., 
November 26, 1938), 2. 
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Federally funded sites of memory such as the Jefferson Memorial do not tell a 
comprehensive story of public memory. Instead, they uncover ideas individuals in power held 
about historical figures or events. Memorials influence public consciousness by framing history 
in a concise and often oversimplified way. The TJMC viewed Jefferson as an embodiment of 
American morals and memorialized him with a “great shrine” that asserted his position in 
American memory as equal to Presidents Washington and Lincoln.  The Memorial Commission 75
had incredible power over Jefferson’s legacy. Despite the public’s resistance, the commission 
permanently placed Jefferson on the pedestal of Washington’s memorial landscape and his status 
as one of the three greatest presidents was set in stone.  
75 President Roosevelt called the memorial a “great shrine.” See, Cornerstone Laying of the Jefferson Memorial, 
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